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Corporate governance mechanisms have been an important issue of enquiry for the researchers in 
financial economics. Both theoretical models and empirical analysis have been developed in this 
area to explain the occurrence of different contractual mechanisms and their efficacy in terms of 
improving managerial performance. A related issue in this literature is the independence and 
competence of the Board of Directors. The Indian corporate scenario was more or less stagnant 
till the early 90s  but, after the liberalisation of the 90s, the position and goals of the Indian 
corporate sector changed a lot. This paper, using only balance sheet information from 4 selected 
sectors of the Indian industry, analyses the efficacy of corporate governance. Our findings, by and 
large, paint a disappointing picture. Overall, the conclusion seems to be that corporate governance 
is still in a very nascent stage in the Indian industry. The decision and policy making is still taken 
mostly as a routine matter. Among the institutional investors also, it seems that the FIIs are the 
most consistent in stock picking whereas the performances of the domestic institutional investors 
are  sporadic  and  volatile  at  best.  This  is  also  serious  shortcoming  on  the  part  of  the  capital 
market, not being able to enforce better governance on the part of the directors or performance on 
the part of the managers. 
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An Analysis of Corporate Performance and Governance in India: 
Study of Some Selected Industries 
 
 
I. Introduction: The issue of Corporate Governance 
 
“Corporate  Governance  mechanisms  are  economic  and  legal  institutions  that  can  be  altered 
through the political process – sometimes for the better.” – Shleifer & Vishny (1997). 
 
Even  if  we  agree  that  competition  is  the  best  mechanism  for  achieving  economic  efficiency 
through  cost  minimisation,  as  predicted  by  the  ‘evolutionary  view  of  economic  changes’ 
(Alchian, 1950, Stigler, 1958), the importance of Corporate Governance cannot be overlooked if 
we keep in mind issues like informational asymmetries and agency problems. 
 
The agency problem, stemming essentially from the separation of ownership and control
1, is the 
backbone of the contractual view of the firm (Coase, 1937, Jensen & Meckling, 1976 and Fama 
&  Jensen,  1983).  In  most  cases  an  investment  project  is  financed  and  managed  by  separate 
people. The financier and the manager/entrepreneur enter into a contract. But , as the contractual 
view notes, it is impossible to specify all future contingencies in the contract, and hence complete 
contracts are not feasible. The decision making power in case a situation not specified in the 
contract  arises  is  referred  to  as  the  residual  control  –  this  is  addressed  to  in  the  theory  of 
ownership. This residual control right is conferred on the managers most of the times essentially 
because of the financiers’ lack of technical expertise to run a project (this, in fact is also the major 
reason why fund owners get to depend on managers for investing their money). This gives them 
(the managers) some discretionary power in fund allocation, etc. A major portion of corporate 
governance  deals  with  the  limits  to  this  discretionary  power.  Hence  the  first  issue  is 
management’s  discretionary  power  resulting  from  technological  infeasibility  of  a  complete 
contract. The managers, in deed, have enough control power over decisions like fund allocation 
even to expropriate investors money through many avenues, and this happens to be a frequently 
observed problem that concerns investors. Also entrenchment of poorly performing managers is 
another very important problem. 
 
                                                            
1 On these issues, see Tirole (1988) and Brealey and Myers (1997).   3
Yet another serious issue where agency problem manifests itself is the choice of projects by 
managers. They often pick projects that benefit themselves and cost the investors dearly. In such 
a situation Coase theorem (1960) might seem ideal to be applied, but problem of agreement 
between numerous investors prevents its application. In fact, the J-M (1976) view that managers 
pick inefficient projects when they donot have equity holdings has been empirically supported. 
Often a performance sensitive, long term incentive contract is thought of as a way out, but this 
might generate ex-post inefficiency and costs huge amounts to investors/financiers. 
 
IA. The Indian scenario 
 
There  has  been  a  recent  focus  on  corporate  governance  among  the  financial  researchers 
worldwide, and in particular in India. The main issue seems to be the independence of non-
executive directors (The Hindu, 2001, several articles)
2. Indian industry is now witnessing the 
transition from sinecures (hand picked directors) to professionally competent and independent 
non-executive directors on the board, but this will not be easy. Very few such competent people 
are in supply. Any suitable candidate needs to have a public stature to inspire confidence in the 
shareholders. She should also be able to contribute to the company and not merely contest the 
management. Ideally, they should be prominent industrialists and not friends or promoters of the 
manager. 
 
The change of goals and facets of the Indian corporate have been significant. The scenario in the 
Pre-Liberalisation  period  was  very  depressing  as  demand  always  exceeded  supply  due  to 
government imposed quotas, “licenses”. This was supposed to check the extent of control owned 
by single individuals. The main issues facing a CEO at that period was 
·  Where to invest excess cash 
·  How to acquire more capacity 
·  How to improve capacity utilization 
 
The  corporate  culture  devolved  around  the  managers  oiling  the  bureaucrats  /  ministers  for 
licenses. This attitude percolated through the corporate sector. Quality and price was not market 
determined (as demand always exceeded supply) which resulted in low quality, cost ineffective 
                                                            
2 Of course this is not the only major issue addressed by researchers. Another salient issue being the 
exploitation of  minority  shareholders  by  the  promoters. But,  as  this will  be  mitigated  when  corporate 
governance improves, we do not address this issue here directly.   4
technology. Also the consumers were not aware of the gap between international and domestic 
standards of products and services. 
 
After the Liberalization, consumers now have a choice. The Indian market is large and hence very 
attractive.  As  a  consequence  MNCs  flooded  the  market.  The  companies  from  the  developed 
countries, where they were facing a saturated market came to invest in India either as green field 
ventures (Samsung), acquiring an Indian business (Coca Cola, Heinz) or Joint Ventures (JVs) 
(Pal – Peugeot, Tata – IBM).   
 
Initially  JV  was  most  popular,  but  that  changed  later  (splits  like  Premier  Automobiles  – 
Automobile  Peugeot,  Tata  and  IBM,  DCM  and  Daewoo)  (See  Roychowdhury  and 
Roychowdhury, 2001 for an interesting theoretical discussion on the issue of JV life cycle.). 
 
In the Indian condition, often the key was cheap labour, and hence the importance of having good 
senior  management  who  were  very  aware  of  local  conditions  was  great.  Public  sector  units 
(PSUs) came under huge threat. Because,  with liberalization, there came government divestment. 
The  management  came  under  pressure  to  show  efficiency  and  profitability.  And  there  was 
considerable  brain  drain  –  all  the  brighter  PSU  employees  went  to  the  private  sector  as  job 
opportunities boomed. Family owned businesses were forced to turn professional or enter into 
contractual arrangements with larger houses.  
 
Roy  (1999)  studied  Takeovers  and  Mergers  (T&M)  in  India:  one  important  instrument  of 
corporate governance. She used data from CMIE for the years 1995 – 7. She observed that the 
mergers were mostly horizontal (allocational efficiency motive) of loss making or performance 
detoriating companies, mostly within same business group. The number is on the increase. Eg. 
Some of the Tata group companies. 
 
A  possible  motive  for  this  could  be  that  Liberalization  in  the  90’s  worked  as  a  threat  of 
competition from the MNCs, which triggered T&M as response from the domestic companies. 
They were facing resource constraints in terms of both  
·  human capital (internal labour market)  and 
·  finance (external selection) 
   5
Now mergers within same group imply that financial resource increase is smaller. So human 
capital is apparently the main motive behind these T&M activities.  
 
IB. Plan of the Paper 
 
This paper is organized into 4 main sections. The next section outlines the background of our 
analysis and the methodology adopted. Several subsections briefly describe the industrial sectors 
we will be studying, the database that we use for this purpose, the model used in our analysis and 
the  definition  of  the  major  variables  under  consideration.  Section  3  then  presents  the  main 
analysis again separated into subsections containing the hypotheses to be tested and the results of 
the  analysis  with  discussion.  Finally,  section  4  summarizes  our  findings  and  concludes.  We 
append the relevant regression results and correlation tables to the end of the paper. 
 
 
II. The Background of the Analysis  
 
The empirical research on corporate governance in developed countries like the USA, Germany 
etc. focus on the following issues.  For a detailed discussion on these and other issues, see the 
excellent surveys by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Denis (2001) among others. 
 
(i)  The activity level of the Board of Directors (BoD), taking into account the number of 
times they meet, the independence of the board, their average age etc. (Cadbury Report, 
1992, Tirole, 1999). 
(ii)  The compensation package of the executives, like the salary package they are offered, 
whether it is pegged to performance and how, the stock options that are given etc. (Baker, 
Jensen and Murphy, 1988, Conyon and Sadler, 2001, Murphy, 1999). 
(iii)  The  level  of  competition  in  the  managerial  labour  market  by  looking  at  the  average 
number of years the managers hold down one job or the turnover rates (Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1989, Tirole, 1999). 
(iv)  The  role  of  ownership  patterns  on  corporate  performance  by  looking  into  investor 
activism, inside ownership and block shareholders’ role in corporate governance (Hull 
and Mazachek, 2001, Hoderness, 2001, Denis, 2001). 
   6
All these analyses can be carried out meaningfully in these countries, as the relevant data are 
available on a systematic basis for researchers. We face a totally different scenario when we 
attempt to analyse this issue of corporate governance for the Indian industrial sector. Not only do 
we not find data on the above mentioned variables, it is also very difficult to get a balanced panel 
of data for a reasonable number of years and with a reasonable number of firms on which reliable 
data is obtained. The solution that we take recourse to in this paper is to use the Prowess (CMIE) 
database  and try to locate balance sheet variables that  might  be used to identify governance 
mechanisms and reactions to it by the managers. We introduce Prowess below. 
 
More specifically, we focus on financial decisions taken by a firm (i.e. managers) and its impact 
on performance. We then juxtapose this linkage with ownership variables and try to find any 
possible relationship among these. We do not know the managerial compensation offered by the 
BoD. What we can observe are the decisions taken by the management and its effect on profit. 
We can also observe the shareholding of the BoD, which determines their incentives. Thus, what 
we are trying to do here is essentially estimating the hidden delegation mechanism layer in a 
delegated optimisation problem from the observable operating decisions layer. So, in spirit, we 
are estimating a neural network model
3 where the lower layer is observable but the upper one is 
not. 
 
The following schematic diagram outlines our argument. We can not observe the “pay packet” 
link, but can observe the other two and hence we have to infer the unobservable one. 
 
 
      Pay Packet      Operating Decisions   
          Shareholding 
 
 
This exercise is done for four of the important sectors of the Indian industry, namely (i) Electrical 
machinery, (ii) Pharmaceuticals, (iii) Software and (iv) Textiles. The first and the fourth sector 
are chosen as the more traditional ones that are now, nevertheless, are facing major changes due 
to  the  financial  liberalisation  in  the  1990s.  The  other  two  are  chosen  to  represent  the  new 
technology sector where innovations and changes are rife. Below, we discuss some of the salient 
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Since globalization, competing and delivering in the international market has become necessary. 
This  calls  for  efficient  management  of  resources  and  developing  /  adopting  more  efficient 
technologies. Policy reforms are still a long way to go. Approvals are slow, political pressures are 
still overbearing. Most SEBs are loss makers and market is still restricted. As a consequence, so 
far investors are not interested in private sector power generation in India. 
 
Indian need for electrical power is quickly mounting. The capacity is boosted quickly but still 
lags behind demand. MNCs expertise in speedy networking and other efficient technologies can 
help in the transformation of the power sector. Use of new sophisticated machinery that boosts 
the stability of power supply can improve efficiency of electrically run machinery by a large 
amount and this is expected to boost the demand for Electrical Machinery sector. 
 
This sector is dominated by the giant BHEL (86% of the market in 1998 – 99). BHEL has shown 
that it is possible to be competitive in the open market (after Liberalisation) by  
(i)  having a motivated workforce  
(ii)  prudent cash management (BHEL is virtually debt free) 
(iii)  constant technological upgradation (JV with GE, strong R&D base) 
(iv)  strategic alliance (GE, Siemens, ABB), also product market competition with these and 
doing it successfully. 
 
BHEL  has  used  technology  transfer  through  licensing,  business  sharing,  JV  etc.  Implication: 
BHEL has a very good order book position. Now it has got an expanding export market (over 55 





                                                                                                                                                                             
3 See Campbell, Lo and Mackinley, 1996 for details on this literature. 
4 The discussion in this section is based on The Hindu (1999 – 2001) and Mookherji (1997).   8
From  a  mere  processing  industry  three  decades  ago,  pharmaceuticals  have  grown  into  a 
sophisticated sector with advanced manufacturing technology, modern equipment and stringent 
quality control. 
 
The industry, vis-a-vis foreign firms, enjoys advantages like  
(i)  lower production cost due to reverse engineering and minimal R&D, 
(ii)  lower import cost due to indigenous raw material, 
(iii)  low labour costs. 
 
With  the  introduction  of  new,  stricter  patent  rules  (WTO,  TRIPS),  after  2005,  the  Indian 
pharmaceuticals industry will not be able to enjoy the benefits of reverse engineering as in the 
past.   
 
Due to the long lag of R&D, only 5 Indian companies have undertaken any serious R&D. But this 
will have to be boosted using a closer government – academia – private sector interaction. The 
companies  now  must  focus  on  research,  marketing,  cost  efficient  technologies,  regional  and 
transnational alignments. They must realize that “size does matter” as there are considerable scale 
economies in R&D. It is well known that R&D time is long in pharma. With the advent of 






The Indian software industry has been witnessing impressive compounded growth rates of about 
50%  over  the  last  decade.  The  National  Association  of  Software  and  Services  Companies 
(NASSCOM)  estimated  that  the  industry  earned  $4  billion  in  exports  in  1999-2000.  This  is 
probably the only globally competitive industry in the organised sector of India. This is largely 
due to the high quality and low cost of Indian software professionals. In the last 10 years, both 
due  to  the  availability  of  professionals  graduating  from  the  premiere  institutes  in  India  and 
repatriation of some of the US taught professionals who decided to return, the industry has seen 
the emergence of some of the big companies who are truly global players (eg. Infosys, TCS, 
HCL, Wipro etc.). 
   9
India was probably the first developing country to target software as a thrust area. Export was 
encouraged and import was restricted earlier. Government of India gives priority to Indian firms 
for their software needs. The post 1991 era saw the economy-wide liberalization programme 
influencing policy in the software industry. With the Central and State governments automating 
their  operations,  the  domestic  software  market  is  also  likely  to  grow.  India  now  also  has  a 





This is the oldest among all industries in India. It’s the second largest employment provider and 
biggest export earner. The area under cotton cultivation is also the largest in the world.  
 
Poor policy making on the part of the Government of India, in terms of tariff and cost structure, 
has  impeded  growth  and  improvement  of  the  quality  of  cotton.  This  sector  has  always  been 
characterized  by  very  high  labour-capital  and  labour-output  ratios,  much  larger  than  optimal 
levels. Also, historically, govt. restricted expanding weaving capacity in the composite mill sector 
in  the  interest  of  handloom.  Which  resulted  in  obsolescence  of  textile  industry  and  eventual 
dominance by power loom. 
  
After Liberalization, now there is considerable competition from MNCs. So, technology intensive 
product development is required and R&D has become necessary. And also the need for efficient 




IIB. The Prowess Database 
 
Prowess, compiled by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), is a firm level 
database on Indian industry. It is broadly similar to the Compustat database of US firms. Prowess 
is being widely used for applied financial research in India, particularly for firm level analysis. 
This database has already been used for studying a variety of issues including the role of large 
shareholders in corporate governance in India (Sarkar and Sarkar, 1999, 2000), effect of group 
affiliation on the performance of a firm (Khanna and Palepu, 1999, 2000). The effect of foreign   10
ownership on performance (Chibber and Majumdar, 1999), impact of financial liberalisation on 
corporate investment (Khasnobis and Bhaduri, 1999 and Bhaduri, 1999) and role of development 
financial institutions as financial intermediaries (Bhandari, Dasgupta and Gangopadhyay, 2000). 
 
The database consists of data on more than 7,500 firms, compiled from their current reports and 
various other sources. The selection criteria for a firm are not based on any formal sampling 
scheme but rather on availability and feasibility of data collection. A firm is included in Prowess 
if one of the following holds. 
 
(i)  The firm has a turnover of more than Rs. 2.5 crores. 
(ii)  The firm’s annual reports are available for at least two latest years prior to the date of 
updating. 
(iii)  The firm is listed on the National Stock Exchange. 
 
The database includes a major part of large manufacturing firms and a relatively small proportion 
of the small or medium firms. Thus, it has a large coverage in terms of the output (80.3% in 1994-
5) and gross value added (73.8% in 1995-6) in the industrial sector in India in terms of National 
accounts statistics. However, the coverage of Prowess in terms of the number of firms is small 
(about 4.6% of the Annual Survey of Industries, India coverage). 
 
One important advantage with Prowess is that it is updated at least monthly, adding on more data 
on the existing firms in the database as well as adding new firms to it. With the ever-increasing 
coverage, the numbers of firms on which data are available for different years are different. As a 
result, composition of any sample data set extracted from Prowess is influenced by the choice of 
the years for which it is extracted. 
 
Our selection of the sample of firms to be analysed is a trade off decision between sample size 
and the length of the time interval. For longer time series, the set of common firms decrease. We 
have decided on 5 or 6 years as the optimal length of time as that leaves us with a reasonable 
number of firms in each sector in our sample. The numbers are 104 for electrical machinery, 53 
for pharmaceuticals, 34 for software and 68 for the textile sector. 
 
   11
IIC. The model 
 
For our analysis we use a very simple statistical technique such as the ordinary least squares 
regression model and the correlation coefficients. We stick to linear analysis for two reasons. 
One,  it  is  often  seen  that  for  qualitative  analysis,  which  focuses  on  the  sign,  and  not  the 
magnitude,  of  the  relationship,  linear  analysis  gives  excellent  results  and  suffices  for  testing 
purposes. Secondly, the results of linear models are much more easily interpretable than more 
complicated non-linear models. Of course, due to the presence of influential outliers in some of 
the data, we sometimes take resort to a pre-cleaning of the data to remove those outliers. These 
are observations that are not representative of the broad relationship that shows up in the bivariate 
scatter plots but which unduly influences the regression or correlation analysis.  
 
So our model is as follows. For each sector (Electrical machinery, Pharmaceuticals, Software and 






+ - × + - × + × + × +
× + × + × + × + × + × + =
) 1 ( ) 1 (          10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1 0
rdk a rdc a rdk a rdc a
impk a impr a std a ltd a kemp a eq a a
 
 
where p = profit 
           eq =  equity capital 
           kemp = capital employed 
           ltd (std) = long (short) term debt 
           impr (impk) = import of raw materials (capital goods) 
           rdc (rdk) = R&D expenditure on capital (revenue) account 
           rdc(-1) and rdk(-1) = one year lagged values of rdc and rdk 
          and e is the usual white noise term. 
 
                                                            
5 Note that this model is not selected on the basis of any optimization exercise, rather this analysis aims at 
finding  direction for such an exercise particularly suitable for the scenario (essentially charactyerised by  
the  incentive  structures  not  observable  by  outsiders,  the  information  structure  and  the  loose  contract 
enforcement mechanisms) in the developing countries, starting from a common sense specification. 
   We have used profit as an indicator of good governance. Evidently, this is not the only possibility. It 
might  be  an  interesting  exercise  to  extend  the  analysis  of  the  present  paper  to  multiple  indicators  of 
corporate governance in a (possibly) simultaneous equation set up.   12
All variables are expressed as proportion of the firm’s net fixed assets. This is done to eliminate 
price,  size  and  trend  effects.  For  a  discussion  on  the  variables  selected,  see  the  following 
subsection. 
 
We also study the correlation matrix for the relevant variables (the regression results, correlation 
matrices and other important statistical analyses are summarised at the end of this paper). 
 
We  considered  fitting  a  fixed  effect  panel  regression  model  to  the  data  to  check  for  time 
consistency of our results in a unified framework. But the data clusters for different years were 
found to be well separated and this kind of analysis turned out to be inappropriate. So we did not 
attempt this here. This also implies that the relationships among the variables under consideration 
are dynamic in nature. 
 
IID. Variables Selected 
 
We have selected a number of variables from the Prowess database for our analysis. We describe 
the major ones below. 
 
(i)  Profit:  
This is net profit after tax. This may not always match with the companies annual report 
figures due to classification of some income or expense items by Prowess as of non-
recurring nature. 
 
(ii)  Import: 
We have taken data on import of raw materials (stores and spares etc.) and import of 
capital goods (plants and machinery) in value terms. 
 
(iii)  R&D expenditure: 
Here, the variables studied are R&D expenditure on capital account (capital) and that on 
revenue account (current). These figures are procured from the  disclosures under the 
companies  rules  (1988)  and  not  from  the  income  and  expenditure  statement  of 
companies. As these are relatively small amounts, the companies often do not show these 
items separately in their expenditure statements. 
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(iv)  Equity capital: 
This is the total outstanding paid-up equity capital of the company at the end of the 
accounting period. Fresh issues and shares not paid-up are not included here. 
 
(v)  Borrowings: 
This includes total borrowings, including all forms of debt, secured or unsecured. This is 
the net outstanding position at the end of the year. Also we consider short term bank 
borrowings, bank loans having a maturity of less that one year are classified in this. 
Usually  this  accounts  for  75  –  80%  of  total  bank  borrowings.  This  is  particularly 
important in estimating the company’s current liabilities correctly. We use this as our 
proxy for the total short term borrowing of a firm. So we define long term borrowing as 
(total borrowing – short term bank borrowing) as a proxy for long term debt. 
 
(vi)  Net fixed assets: 
These  are  the  total  fixed  assets,  net  of  accumulated  depreciation,  that  are  used  for 
producing goods and services. These include movable as well as immovable assets. Fixed 
assets comprise a significant part of the total assets of an enterprise and therefore are 
important in determining the size of a firm.  
 
(vii)  Capital employed: 
This is one of the derived variables in the Prowess database. We include this variable to 
check  whether  the  management  is  prudent  and  sincere  enough  to  employ  the  capital 
efficiently. The idea is as follows: if this variable has a significant positive effect on 
profit we can conclude that capital is being employed efficiently (the scale effect of the 
size of this  variable will be controlled for as of all other variables), and so on. The 
definition of the variable is as follows: 
Capital employed = (equity + preference) capital +  
      (reserves – revaluation reserves – expenditure to be amortized) +  
      (total borrowing – short term bank borrowing – commercial paper) 
 
 
(viii)  We also looked at the data on various components of sales, wages, costs, exports,  
investments, distribution of equity, cash flow etc. to judge the relationships among the 
key variables. This helped us to decide on our final choice of model.   14
 
(ix)  Ownership structure: 
This is collected from the equity holding pattern fields in Prowess that gives us an idea 
about the proportional holding of shares by government companies, foreign investors, 
mutual  funds  (MF)  etc.  in  any  firm  as  well  as  ownership  concentration  and  insider 
ownership. 
For example, we have taken variables like equity shares held by (as percentage of total 
shares) government companies, directors, top 50 shareholders etc. 
 
 
III. The Empirical Analysis 
 
IIIA. The Hypotheses to be Tested 
   
1.  Utilisation of capital is a vital issue. If effuciently utilised, then capital use should be profit 
conducive. A higher proportion of capital employed should imply a higher rate of profit. 
 
2.  Debt creates leverage for a firm. Hence, a judicious use of debt should be such that if the firm 
increase its outstanding debt then the rate of profit should be non-decreasing, provided the 
debt increment decision has been the result of a properly defined optimisation problem. 
 
3.  Research and Development (R&D) is necessary for a firm in a competitive industry, more so 
after the Liberalisation steps taken by the Government of India in the last decade. The firms, 
especially in the new technology sectors like Pharmaceuticals, are now going for larger R&D 
investments  to  improve  their  production  technology  or  to  develop  new  products.  If  the 
managers or executives of a firm are behaving optimally, then the marginal productivity of 
R&D  should  be  positive.  So  we  can  test  for  the  hypothesis  that  an  increase  in  R&D 
expenditure should improve profits. 
 
Sometimes R&D is a forward-looking process. The investments that we make today bear fruit 
in  the  next  period  or  even  at  longer horizons.  The  impact  on  profitability  is  usually not 
instantaneous. Hence we also test for the sign of marginal productivity of previous year’s 
R&D  on  profit.  Of  course,  just  a  one-year  lag  is  not  sufficient  as  the  effects  of  R&D 
expenditure  often  takes  hold  after  3  or  4  years  or  even  longer.  For  example,  for  the   15
Pharmaceuticals sector, this lag can be as long as 15 years! But, due to the paucity of data in 
our panel, we have not considered lags of more than one year. 
 
4.  Similarly, import decisions are also important in terms of demands on the firm’s foreign 
exchange capacity. Hence, import decisions should be very carefully taken by the managers 
and monitored by an active board of directors. So we also test for the efficacy of import, of 
both raw materials and capital items, with respect to profitability. 
 
5.  The equity capital base of a firm is the third and often very crucial source of finance (after 
internal funds and debt). The decision about extending the equity capital base of a firm is 
normally taken as a last resort by an alert management. We finally check for the sign of the 
effect of equity on profitability. 
 
6.  Ownership patterns are very important for corporate governance. Often, a very closely held 
firm is actively governed because of better co-ordination among the shareholders and hence 
closer scrutiny by the directors, and sometimes due to the presence of significant stakes for 
the managers themselves in the firm. Thus we check for the relationship of profits and equity 
capital with shareholders concentration and directors’ shareholding. 
 
Also,  a  better-run  firm  is  a  target  for  investment  by  financial  institutions  (FIs),  foreign 
institutional investors (FIIs), mutual funds (MFs) and other institutional investors. So we also 
check the relation between the profits of a firm and the proportional shareholding of these 
institutions  in  the  firm.  Thus  our  final  set  of  hypotheses  tests  whether  shareholding 
concentration,  insider  ownership,  shareholding  by  the  FIs,  FIIs,  MFs  etc.  are    positively 
related to profit and equity capital variables. 
 
 
IIIC. The Results 
 
The salient results for the analysis of each sector is presented below. 
 
I.  Electrical Machinery 
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(i)  Capital employed  is seen to be conducive to profitability of the firms in aggregate for this 
sector. The coefficient of kemp is positive and statistically significant for all the years 1996 
to 2001. This result is very emphatic in stating that, for this sector, the employment of 
capital has been, on average, in the right direction. 
 
(ii)  Both long and short-term debt has significantly negative coefficients for most of the years 
(5 out of 6 for both, see table) in our regression. This result is alarming in the sense that 
issue of more debt is apparently damaging for a firm from the point of view of profitability. 
An explanation for this surprising finding may be found in the slackness of the banking 
system in our country in terms of loan recovery. As the principal source of credit, the 
nationalised banks in our country has been advancing large loans to the priority sectors of 
the  economy,  of  which  the  electrical  machinery  is  one.  But,  most  of  these  loans  are 
unrecovered. The total volume of non-performing assets
6 or our nationalised banks is mind 
boggling (over Rs. 40,000 crores in 1996-7) most of which are loans forwarded to large 
houses in the priority sector. In fact, it has become a common ploy for the ill performing 
firms in those sectors to recycle debt from banks in the face of detoriating performance. 
Thus the leverage argument do not seem to hold for this sector due to lack of appropriate 
recovery mechanism and accountability checks in the banking sector.  
 
(iii)  We included 4 R&D variables in our regressions, two contemporaneous and two lagged. 
But in all of 6 regressions, only rdc came out to be significant (and positive) in the year 
1998 only. Thus, overall, the impression is that R&D decisions are ineffective in terms of 
profitability  of  a  firm  for  this  sector,  at  least,  for  the  lag  we  considered.  The  decision 
regarding R&D is not taken with careful deliberation with the firm’s performance in mind 
but rather it is taken in a routine manner that does not effect the performance at all. This 
result is disappointing, more specifically in the wake of financial Liberalisation when R&D 
decisions have become a lot more important than before (as discussed earlier). 
 
(iv)  Import of key raw materials often proved a profitable strategy for the heavy machinery 
sector of Indian industry in the past. This fact is borne out in our empirical exercise. For the 
earlier years, up to 1997, this kind of import enhanced the profitability of a firm. The 
importance  seems  to  have  decreased  in  the  recent  years,  may  be  due  to  increasing 
                                                            
6 Loans on which interest or principal has not been paid for at least the last two quarters.   17
availability  of  such  imports  in  the  domestic  market  from  MNC  vendors  who  are  now 
coming into the market. 
 
Import of capital items (plant, machinery etc.) seems to be an item on which little thought is 
spared by the firms. Although key inputs under this heading can improve the performance 
of a firm in the machinery-producing sector significantly, like R&D. This fact seems to 
have  been  largely  ignored  by  the  managers  in  this  sector.  This  does  not  signal  good 
management or governance for this sector. 
 
(v)  The decisions about the choice of equity capital are crucial, as we have already discussed. 
In this respect, we first look at the effect of an expansion in equity capital on profit. The 
regression shows this to be negative and significant for 3 out of the 6 years. The “+” sign in 
1998 disappear if we drop one influential outlier data point. Also note that for the data of 
1997 also, we did drop one very influential observation and the results that are presented 
here are based on the deleted data set. The original results, without the pre-cleaning, were 
dramatically different. The results imply that a profitable strategy for any firm seems to be 
to  shrink  the  proportion  of  equity  capital  over  time.  We  will  now  check  whether  this 
decision is influenced by ownership patterns. 
 
(vi)  We now take a look at the correlation of eq and p with the principal ownership variables 
that we have data on for one particular year (2001 for our data set. Prowess does not 
provide this data for each year but only does so for the last available year.). 
 
The correlation coefficients imply that equity expansion is negatively related to directors’ 
shareholding (but the relationship is not very strong), as a consequence, profitability of a 
firm increases with the directors’ shareholding (this is also borne out by the corresponding 
correlation). This augurs well in terms of corporate governance. A higher insider holding 
(stake of the monitors) induces better supervision and hence higher profits. In contrast, 
shareholding  concentration  is  apparently  detrimental  to  performance  as  shown  by  the 
relevant  correlation.  This  may  be  due  to  the  traditional  closely  held  firms  that  are 
inefficiently run in terms of modernisation (information) or competitive attitude. 
 
The holdings of FIIs and government companies are positively related with p, which shows 
their alertness in terms of profitable investment opportunities. On the other hand, FIs, MFs   18
and banks do not perform well in this respect. This has a somewhat mixed implication in 
terms  of  governance  through  external  factors,  in  terms  of  attracting  investment  in  the 
company. This, to some extent matches with recent empirical work based on US data that 
claims that MFs are historically not very good stock-pickers (Carhart, 1997). This evidence 
is discouraging but non-confirmatory as we have relevant data for one year only. Hence we 
do not place a lot of weightage on this piece of evidence. 
 
 
II.  Pharmaceuticals 
 
(i)  The implication of our results in terms of kemp is exactly the same as for the electrical 
machinery sector, hence we need not reiterate the same discussion. 
 
(ii)  The conclusion in terms of the effectiveness of debt holding in respect of profit induction is 
very weak for this sector. This is good in one sense that it does not support the implication 
of poor debt recovery as in the electrical sector but also bad in the sense of absence of 
leverage as we have already discussed. 
 
(iii)  Again, R&D evidence for this sector is very similar to the earlier one but for one year 
(1996),  rdk  turns  out  to  be  detrimental  for  profits.  This  is  a  bad  sign  with  respect  to 
managerial alertness in R&D investment on capital account. Also, rdc(-1) has a negative 
sign in 1996, but this may have been caused by the variable’s high collinearity (r = 0.83) 
with rdc for this year. The negative coefficient of rdc(-1) in 2001 is again surprising at first 
glance but it is actually due to collinearity with kemp for that year.  
 
(iv)  Import conclusions are also very similar to the earlier sector. All the relevant coefficients 
turn out to be insignificant. So the conclusions are similar. In one sense, it is a positive 
signal for the self-dependence of our pharmaceuticals sector in the recent years. 
 
(v)  Again equity capital related conclusions are similar to the electrical machinery sector. 
 
(vi)  Here, both eq and p are negatively related with directors’ shareholding. So, whereas the 
conclusions in terms of equity expansion are same as in electrical machinery, in contrast, 
insider holding by the directors for this sector adversely effects profitability of the firm.   19
This may be due to the fact that the shareholding of the directors in this sector are rigid for 
the worse performing firms and the directors are not very effective. Here also shareholding 
concentration is detrimental to profitability and a similar explanation may be given. 
 
Again FIIs do a good job in stock-picking in this sector and now FIs and MFs are also 
doing very well in contrast to the electrical machinery sector. 
 
 
III.  Software 
 
(i)  Kemp has again a significantly positive role for most of the years. 
 
(ii)  Debt has a stronger negative impact (coefficients are negative significant for most of the 
years  and  insignificant  otherwise)  on  profitability  in  this  sector,  which  implies  an 
explanation similar to that for the electrical sector. 
 
(iii)   The implication of R&D activity is much more pronounced in this sector and here we have 
a  clear  differentiation  between  the  effects  of  R&D  on  capital  account  and  that  on  the 
revenue account. Whereas rdk is detrimental to profits, rdc has (in 2 out of 5 years) a 
positive impact on profitability of firms in the software sector. This is a somewhat mixed 
result  and  implies  some  alertness  on  the  part  of  the  managers  in  handling  the  current 
account R&D but on the other hand, the capital account R&D is very badly managed on an 
average. This may have major policy implications for this sector. 
 
The sign of the previous year R&D variables are reversed in the years when they turned out 
to be significant. This is surprising but it is seen on inspection that there is substantial 
collinearity between the R&D variables and their lagged versions. This may have caused 
the sign reversal. Thus these signs are likely to be unstable and hence unreliable. 
 
(iv)  Again, the role of import is mostly positive, where it is significant, in terms of profit for 
this sector. The significance of the coefficients is more frequent. The only exception being 
the negative sign of raw material import in 1996 which does not match the usual pattern 
here. But overall, the conclusion seems to be that the usage of import (and hence foreign 
exchange) has been well done in this sector.   20
 
(v)  In  contrast  with  the  earlier  two  sectors,  now  the  proportion  of  equity  plays  a  less 
detrimental role to profitability. It also appears with a positive significant coefficient in the 
regression model for the software sector in the year 1999. The negative sign in 1997 is due 
to  the  presence  of  an  influential  outlier  in  the  data.  On  removing  this  observation  the 
coefficient  becomes  insignificant.  Hence  this  negative  sign  is  not  too  serious  an 
observation. 
 
So by and large, for this sector, expansion of equity is a good sign for a firm. 
 
(vi)  When  we  look  at  the  correlation  coefficients,  the  effect  of  directors’  shareholding  and 
shareholding  concentration  is  same  as  that  in  the  electrical  machinery  sector.  The 
explanations would be similar. 
 
In terms of institutional investors, the only difference with the results in the electrical sector 




IV.  Textiles 
 
(i)  Again kemp has a positive role in this sector too but the incidence is now less frequent 
(only 2 out of 5 coefficients are significant). 
 
(ii)  For this sector debt plays a positive role and leveraging argument seems to hold for this 
sector. This is an initially surprising result as all the sectors are functioning in the same 
institutional  setting  after  all.  But  this  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that,  historically,  the 
government  of  India  has  been  tight  fisted  about  the  profit  making  large-scale  textile 
manufacturers  in  favour  of  the  small  mills,  which  were  highly  inefficient  (we  have 
discussed this before). The positive coefficients for 4 out of 5 years are indeed pleasant 
findings. 
 
(iii)  R&D come out with a stronger negative role for this sector. All the significant coefficients 
are negative (the positive sign for rdk in 1998 again changes sign and becomes insignificant   21
if we drop one outlier observation). R&D allocations are apparently done in a very non-
optimal manner in this sector. One of the reasons could be wasting huge amounts of money 
in developing products that are actually cheaper to import or that have cheaper substitutes. 
In the textile sector, one of the main items of research is developing threads with more 
advanced user friendly features. This kind of research can be a huge source of loss if not 
planned properly or ill directed. This fact comes out quite starkly in the coefficients of 
R&D and its lagged versions. 
 
(iv)  Import is found to exert little effect on profitability in this sector implying an almost total 
lack of optimal decision making behaviour on the part of the managers with respect to the 
use of foreign exchange. This is again a bad signal as discussed for the electrical machinery 
sector. 
 
(v)  The  conclusions  for  equity  are  again  similar  to  that  of  the  electrical  machinery  or  the 
pharmaceuticals sector. 
 
(vi)  For this sector, directors’ shareholding exerts a negative effect on both equity expansion 
and profit. The conclusions would be similar to the pharmaceuticals sector. The shares are 
very widely held in this sector. The measure of concentration, percentage of shareholding 
for the top 50 shareholders, shows the value of zero for all the firms in the sample. Thus we 
can not relate this with eq or p. 
 






Corporate governance mechanisms have been an important issue of enquiry for the researchers in 
financial economics. The agency problem of the problem due to the separation of ownership and 
control, which is starkly manifested in the corporate sector, is discussed in this literature. Both 
theoretical  models  and  empirical  analysis  have  been  developed  in  this  area  to  explain  the 
occurrence  of  different  contractual  mechanisms  and  their  efficacy  in  terms  of  improving 
managerial performance. Mechanisms like performance sensitive pay, employees’ stock option,   22
insider ownership has been tested and researched extensively. A related issue in this literature is 
the independence and competence of the Board of Directors. This is also a target of considerable 
attention in recent years. 
 
The Indian corporate scenario was more or less stagnant till the early 90s while the “license raj” 
was prevalent and the oiling culture was pervasive. But, after the liberalisation of the 90s, the 
position and goals of the Indian corporate sector changed a lot. The consumers got an upper hand 
in the face of stiffer product market competition where the MNCs also participated. 
 
This paper, using only balance sheet information, analyses the efficacy of corporate governance 
in terms of inducing the firms’ managers to take optimal decisions. The data is from 4 selected 
sectors of the Indian industry. We constructed a balanced panel of a reasonable number of firms 
and length of time for each sector and used linear regression model and correlation analysis to test 
our hypotheses. 
 
Our findings, by and large, paint a disappointing picture. These findings imply that for most of 
the sectors, the R&D and import decisions are taken very non-optimally. R&D investments seem 
to have hardly any effect on the profitability of a firm. Also, debt leverage does not seem to work 
for the Indian industry. The decisions to issue debt are not performance enhancing as for an 
efficient sector. Directors’ shareholding and shareholding concentration, the factors which are 
supposed to enhance shareholders activism and alertness of the BoD, are also ineffectual for most 
of the sectors. 
 
Overall, the conclusion seems to be that corporate governance is still in a very nascent stage in 
the Indian industry. The decision and policy making is still taken mostly as a routine matter. The 
management is also not yet on its feet and their operating decisions may be more effected by 
culture and tradition rather than scientific optimisation or sound business sense. 
 
Among the institutional investors also, it seems that the FIIs are the most consistent in stock 
picking whereas the performances of the domestic institutional investors are sporadic and volatile 
at best. This is also serious shortcoming on the part of the capital market, not being able to 
enforce better governance on the part of the directors or performance on the part of the managers. 
   23
Due to the lack of systematic data, we have been unable to analyse the efficacy of alternative 
incentive mechanisms for the managers directly. With the recent surge of attention to this area of 
research,  probably  more  detailed  data  on  such  variables  will  become  available  in  future  and 
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Table showing summarized regression results for the sector Pharmaceutical: 
 
Obs=53  eq  rdk   rdc  kemp  ltd  std  impr  impk  rdk(-1)  rdc(-1) 
1996 
(0.5785) 
-.4098224   
-3.085   
0.004 
-8.95337   
-2.108   
0.041 
11.79207    
2.148   
0.038 
.4454059    
4.946   
0.000 
.4587211    
1.497   
0.142 
-.734556   
-2.575   
0.014 
-.0857316   
-0.326   
0.746 
.7173398    
0.324   
0.748 
3.235916    
0.813   
0.421 
-30.2482   





-1.638   
0.109 
-.042181  
-0.025   
0.980 
6.559335   
4.880   
0.000 
.1402598   
3.984   
0.000 
-.1065205  
-1.559   
0.126 
.0977416   
1.355   
0.183 
-.1040597  
-1.485   
0.145 
.5928947   
0.785   
0.437 
-.7205188  
-0.293   
0.771 
-3.902674  





-2.573   
0.014 
.9106708   
0.893   
0.377 
.2791732   
0.160   
0.873 
.0946607   
3.713   
0.001 
-.027888  
-0.547   
0.587 
.0568349   
0.833   
0.409 
-.0778713  
-0.926   
0.360 
1.203853   
1.705   
0.096 
.0092237   
0.008   
0.994 
2.03423   







-2.295   
0.027 
1.047207   
0.764   
0.449 
1.788833   
0.605   
0.548 
.1214507   
4.946   
0.000 
-.1602877  
-1.534   
0.133 
.0597473   
0.636   
0.528 
-.063339  
-0.620   
0.539 
1.246745   
1.331   
0.190 
1.956712   
1.271   
0.211 
-1.307789  




-.1297138   
-3.040   
0.004 
.3412787    
0.231   
0.818 
.0410791    
0.033   
0.974 
.1666673    
7.845   
0.000 
-.137111   
-2.682   
0.010 
-.0013494   
-0.017   
0.987 
.0905881    
0.899   
0.374 
.1600092    
0.049   
0.962 
1.615343    
1.562   
0.126 
.7939656    





-0.982   
0.332 
2.458446   
0.590   
0.558 
.990837   
0.637   
0.527 
.257889   
3.929   
0.000 
-.1683685  
-1.064   
0.293 
-.2684871  
-1.185   
0.243 
-.0627662  
-0.153   
0.879 
-4.599381  
-0.832   
0.410 
7.127104   
1.136   
0.262 
-6.770029  











                                                            
9 obs=52,since nfa=0 for 1 observation.   28
 
Table showing summarized regression results for the sector Software: 
 




-0.012   
0.991 
-1.93122  
-1.722   
0.097 
.0957328   
0.051   
0.959 
.5183537   
6.490   
0.000 
-.5027638  
-6.504   
0.000 
.3500521   
1.391   
0.176 
-.2153619  
-1.985   
0.058 
1.284139   
1.611   
0.120 




-5.342   
0.000 
-7.57077  
-0.881   
0.387 
3.388534   
2.010   
0.056 
.3160152   
5.315   
0.000 
-.4232208  
-3.187   
0.004 
.0726261   
0.514   
0.612 
.0026607   
0.051   
0.960 
1.729116   
2.016   
0.056 
15.88619   
1.150   
0.262 
-4.511307  





-4.629   
0.000 
1.282464   
0.700   
0.491 
-2.05032  
-0.810   
0.426 
.2475999   
4.530   
0.000 
-.5820208  
-3.281   
0.003 
-.4933424  
-3.858   
0.001 
-.0101538  
-0.133   
0.895 
1.308426   
1.423   
0.168 
1.175904   
0.167   
0.869 
.7145633   





3.487   
0.002 
-23.9002 
-1.906   
0.069 
6.34706  
4.712   
0.000 
.0447317  
0.855   
0.402 
-.2218816 
-0.996   
0.330 
-1.02747 
 -5.509   
0.000 
.1622267  
1.909   
0.069 
1.130664  
1.273   
0.216 
15.29911  
1.757   
0.092 
-7.954116 




.2168666   
1.411   
0.172 
-.879852  
-0.116   
0.909 
1.160612   
0.336   
0.740 
.0713703   
1.464   
0.157 
.1024596   
0.260   
0.797 
-.5302601  
-1.790   
0.087 
-.0198796  
-0.138   
0.892 
2.471634   
2.068   
0.050 
.8220055   
0.059   
0.954 
-2.378209  
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Table showing summarized regression results for the sector Textile: 
 




-2.306   
0.025 
2.227722  
1.648   
0.105 
25.28678  
0.778   
0.440 
.1271812  
2.661   
0.010 
.040245  
3.200   
0.002 
-.0977048 
-1.416   
0.162 
.0678935  
0.440   
0.662 
.1117142  
0.417   
0.678 
-5.847545 
-0.747   
0.458 
-35.48803 





-0.477   
0.635 
3.845903   
0.472   
0.639 
-15.4299  
-0.430   
0.669 
.0493225   
0.807   
0.423 
.116625   
8.295   
0.000 
.0890379   
1.124   
0.266 
.1438583   
0.826   
0.412 
.225425   
0.664   
0.509 
-.7598965  
-0.705   
0.484 
11.02885   





-0.437   
0.664 
38.97029   
2.500   
0.015 
-1.49666  
-0.019   
0.985 
.1277147   
1.475   
0.146 
.18561  
10.489   
0.000 
.0213254   
0.143   
0.887 
.0714155   
0.279   
0.781 
.2827874   
0.505   
0.616 
-74.31438  
-4.353   
0.000 
7.631601   





0.857   
0.395 
105.948  
1.190   
0.239 
7.768142  
0.320   
0.750 
.0996441  
0.637   
0.526 
-.0547665 
-2.017   
0.048 
-.5919773 
-1.662   
0.102 
-.0915823 
-0.154   
0.878 
-.4734541 
-0.268   
0.790 
-74.11927 
-1.433   
0.157 
-142.1758 





-4.148   
0.000 
-192.411  
-9.087   
0.000 
-.190457  
-0.019   
0.985 
.1665286   
1.706   
0.093 
.1251424   
7.257   
0.000 
-.1379138  
-0.873   
0.386 
.3365557   
2.059   
0.044 
-.4821714  
-0.399   
0.691 
64.94161   
1.623   
0.110 
1.689496   












   30
Table showing Correlation coefficients for Electrical machinery, 2000 
 
 
     |   p      eq       rdk      rdc      kemp     ltd      std     impr     impk     rdk(-1)  rdc(-1) 
-----+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   p |   1.0000 
  eq |  -0.0714   1.0000 
 rdk |   0.1152  -0.0560   1.0000 
 rdc |   0.6742   0.0333   0.2170   1.0000 
kemp |   0.8314   0.1744   0.0668   0.7990   1.0000 
 ltd |  -0.2585   0.2658  -0.0875  -0.1355  -0.0398   1.0000 
 std |  -0.4761   0.3325   0.0283  -0.0288  -0.1530   0.2725   1.0000 
impr |   0.2670   0.0326   0.0519   0.2822   0.2774  -0.3341   0.1402   1.0000 
impk |   0.0812  -0.0889   0.0099  -0.0561   0.0116   0.0176  -0.1224   0.1805   1.0000 
rdk-1|  -0.0336  -0.0768   0.6074   0.1011  -0.0560  -0.1157   0.0269  -0.0224   0.0373   1.0000 







Table showing Correlation coefficients for Pharmaceutical, 2000: 
 
     |      p       eq      rdk     rdc       Kemp      lte     ste     impR     impK     rdk(-1)  rdc(-1) 
-----+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  p  |   1.0000 
  eq |  -0.1306   1.0000 
 rdk |   0.1411  -0.1761   1.0000 
 rdc |   0.6718  -0.0937   0.2333   1.0000 
kemp |   0.8480   0.1752   0.0275   0.6745   1.0000 
 ltd |  -0.1515   0.0012   0.2462  -0.0564   0.0055   1.0000 
 std |  -0.1851   0.1796  -0.0790  -0.1920  -0.1335   0.0326   1.0000    
impr |   0.4238  -0.2906   0.5493   0.2734   0.2933   0.0935  -0.1186   1.0000 
impk |   0.1138  -0.3050   0.6720   0.2317  -0.0395   0.0647  -0.2184   0.4568   1.0000 
rdk-1|   0.2213  -0.2232   0.4089   0.1285   0.0364   0.0608  -0.0240   0.2658   0.2103   1.0000 
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Tables showing correlation of eq and p p p p  
with shareholding pattern variables. 
 
Electrical Machinery: 
         |    eq        p  
---------+------------------ 
foreign_ |  -0.0857   0.1621    
fin_inst |  -0.2599  -0.1652   
insuranc |  -0.0583  -0.0298   
mutual_f |  -0.2596  -0.1055   
banks_sh |  -0.0408  -0.1210   
govt_cos |   0.5475   0.1172 
corpn_sh |  -0.1112  -0.1091   
director |  -0.0811   0.0725   




         |     eq       p 
---------+------------------ 
foreign_ |  -0.0685   0.1874    
fin_inst |  -0.2705   0.2244    
insuranc |   0.2362  -0.0329     
mutual_f |  -0.2937   0.2105    
corpn_sh |   0.0880  -0.1645   
director |  -0.1941  -0.1716   





         |    eq        p 
---------+------------------ 
foreign_ |  -0.0616   0.0004 
fin_inst |   0.0205  -0.2433 
insuranc |   0.2481  -0.2050 
mutual_f |  -0.2223  -0.0202 
banks_sh |  -0.0239   0.1908 
govt_cos |  -0.0771  -0.2327 
corpn_sh |   0.7195  -0.0532 
director |  -0.3481   0.0964 





         |    eq        p 
---------+------------------ 
foreign_ |   0.0504   0.0192 
fin_inst |  -0.0966  -0.1635 
insuranc |  -0.0284  -0.0242 
mutual_f |  -0.2874  -0.2344 
banks_sh |  -0.1143  -0.0062 
corpn_sh |   0.2133   0.2373 
director |  -0.2395  -0.0483 
top50_sh |   0.9069   0.8518  
                                                            
10 For these two sectors, matching year was not possible due to lack of enough observations 
pertaining to the same year on relevant variable. 